Rather than displaying merely some odd, fortuitous associations, these universal synesthetic experiences reflect important cognitive properties that in several respects are common to normal people as well as to synesthetes (Marks, 1975, 303).
One of the central outstanding puzzles about synesthesia, and one that is at least partly to blame for the recent surge in attention given to the condition by philosophers and psychologists, is that of understanding the relationship inherited or acquired (Armel and Ramachandran, 1999; Beauchamp and Ro, 2008; Harrison and Baron-Cohen, 1995; Cohen Kadosh et al., 2009; Asher et al., 2009) . Similarly, there is controversy over whether the experience of an A-B synesthete (one whose perceptual encounters with A cause an experience that is associated in normals with perception of B) is like that of a normal subject but with an added, synesthetic layer of normal experience (as it were, a normal A-type experience conjoined with a normal B-type experience), or whether her synesthetic experience is simply alien/incomparable to the experiential inventory of normals. There is controversy about the implications synesthesia has for the individuation of the senses (Keeley, 2013) and philosophical views such as functionalism (Gray et al., 1997 (Gray et al., , 2002 Macpherson, 2007) , representationalism (Wager, 1999 (Wager, , 2001 Alter, 2006; Gray, 2001b; Rosenberg, 2004) , and modularity (Baron- Cohen et al., 1993; Segal, 1997; Gray, 2001a) . 3 Despite all this controversy, there is at least one idea about synesthesia that seems uncontroversial: on more or less all accounts, synesthesia involves the presence of (abnormal) causal influence between systems that, in ordinary circumstances, represent distinct features. That is, what makes a graphemecolor synesthete's experience (more generally, an A-B synesthete's experience) notable is that, in her, the system that in ordinary circumstances represents grapheme identity (/A) activates or mediates representations in the system that, in, ordinary circumstances, represent color (/B). Hence occurrences of A in such a subject (the "trigger"/"inducer") mediate representations of B (the "concurrent"). When, in such cases, the B system (unusually) draws on information represented in the A system, we can describe this as a kind of cross-talk, or informational integration between the A system and the B system. 4 unusual fonts or Roman numerals will bring about the concurrent color representation). Dixon et al. (2004) mark a separate distinction between "projector" synesthetes, who experience their concurrents as located in space, and "associator" synesthetes, who do not.
3 For a useful overview of these and other controversies about synesthesia, see Auvray and Deroy (2013) . 4 Two remarks about the notion of informational integration at work are in order. (Thanks to Matthew Fulkerson for discussion of these points.)
First, the term 'informational integration' shouldn't be taken to imply that the states of the A and B systems between which there is an integration carry information about a common distal feature type. Rather, the suggestion is that there is an interaction between two states that carry information, despite their carrying information about different feature types. (Thus, for example, in the case of grapheme-color synesthesia, the interaction obtains between a first state that carries information about distal grapheme form and a second state that carries information about distal color.) Second, the sense of 'integration' at issue is relatively weak. In particular, it is not always true about such cases that independently generated A representations and B representations are combined in any interesting computational way. Indeed, in many such cases there may not be any independent (non-synesthetically induced) B representation at all: the B system is (erroneously) activated despite the absence of whatever features the B system ordinarily represents. Of course, that's not always true: for example, a grapheme-color synesthete who synesthetically represents the grapheme 'L' as green will typically also perceive (non-synesthetically) the black color of the ink in which that grapheme is printed. (This point explains the possibility of Strooplike interference between synesthetic and non-synesthetic representations -now a common diagnostic for synesthesia (Dixon et al., 2000; Mattingley et al., 2001; Mills et al., 1999) that, on its Now, saying this much leaves a cornucopia of questions unanswered. Perhaps most significantly, it presupposes some method for individuating psychological systems and identifying them with ordinary content-types. It also leaves plenty of room for disagreement about the nature of the causal connections between the systems, and just what systems (only perceptual systems? mid-level perceptual systems? cognitive systems?) will, when joined in the relevant way, count as synesthetically linked. And it leaves open all of the controversial issues gestured at in the prior paragraph. But this far-reaching agnosticism is just the point: the idea that synesthesia involves connections between normally unconnected psychological systems constitutes an island of consensus in a sea of controversy about the condition. And it has, I suggest, a good claim to the status of essential core of our understanding of what synesthesia amounts to.
This idea is present in the Greek etymological roots of the term: syn-(joining), -aesthesis (sensation). It is reflected in the standard characterization of the condition as a merging/mixing/union/unity of the senses, 5 And it shows up in some form in all of the proposed theoretical definitions and glosses. Thus, for example, Marks (1978, 8) defines synesthesia as "the transposition of sensory images or sensory attributes from one modality to another" (cf. Marks, 1975, 303) . Harrison and Baron-Cohen (1997) "define synaesethesia as occurring when stimulation of one sensory modality automatically triggers a perception in a second modality, in the absence of any direct stimulation to this second modality" (3). Harrison (2001) describes the condition as "implying the experience of two or more sensations occurring together" (3). Cytowic (2001) offers the idea of a "sensory blending" (2). According to Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) ,"Synaesthesia is a curious condition in which an otherwise normal person experiences sensations in one modality when a second modality is stimulated" (4). Similarly, Gray et al. (2002) write that "Synaesthesia is a condition in which, in otherwise normal individuals, stimulation in one sensory modality reliably elicits the report of a sensation in another" (5).
6 A more complicated expression of the idea comes out in Macpherson's definition: Synaesthesia is a condition in which either: (i) an experience in one sensory modality, or (ii) an experience not in a sensory modality, such as an experience of emotion, or (iii) an imagining or thought of what is so experienced, or face, appears to be some kind of interesting computational combination between independently generated A and B representations.) In any case, it is true that I have a relatively weak sense of 'integration' in mind. In characterizing the cases as informational interactions or integrations I mean only that the B system (unusually) draws on information represented in the A system, so there is no informational firewall between the two.
(iv) a mental state outlined in either (i)-(iii), together with recognition of what the mental state represents is either a sufficient automatic cause of, or has a common sufficient automatic cause (lying within the central nervous system of the subject) with, an experience or element of experience that is associated with some sensory modality and is distinct from (i).
This synaesthetic experience or element of experience can be associated with the same or a different sensory modality from that which may be ordinarily associated with the mental state in (i)-(iv) (Macpherson, 2007, 70). 7 Without meaning to downplay or ignore the important and interesting differences between these competing definitions, I want to make the simple point that they are all, appropriately, agreeing on the central idea about synesthesia with which we started. Namely, they are agreeing (despite their differences) that the condition crucially involves the activation and mediation by a system that ordinarily represents a first type of information of a system that ordinarily represents a second type of information.
There is an obvious diagnosis of the convergence on this idea by so many different theoretical proposals: viz., that the idea genuinely captures what lies at the heart of our understanding of synesthesia. At any rate, I propose that we adopt this view, and carry out our comparison between synesthesia and normal perception by (at least in part) asking whether that core idea distinguishes synesthesia from normal perception. This will be the task of §1.2.
Normal Perception
Needless to say, the view we take about the relationship between synesthetic and normal perception will depend not only on how we are thinking about synesthesia but also on our understanding of normal perception. This matters because there are ways of thinking of normal perception in currency that make the informational integration characteristic of synesthetic perception look more exceptional than I believe it is. I want to argue that, on the contrary, information sharing is absolutely rife in normal perception. And this, I'll 7 Note that Macpherson's definition (unlike the others quoted) does not restrict attention to associations between specifically sensory representations. Among other benefits, the absence of this restriction leaves Macpherson's definition in a better position than competitors to accommodate the "higher" synesthetes of Ramachandran and Hubbard (2001) , in whose synesthetic experience the role of sensory or perceptual representation is at best incidental. On the other hand, I confess to a certain uneasiness about Macpherson's treatment of crossmodal illusion (e.g., the McGurk effect), which Macpherson is eager to distinguish from synesthesia. (She makes this distinction by restricting attention to sufficient causes in clause (iv); Macpherson (cf. 2007, 70-71) ). For what it's worth, I lack firm intuitions about where crossmodal illusion cases fall with respect to the bounds of synesthesia, and don't see strong theoretical reasons for wanting to keep them as separate as Macpherson does. (But see Macpherson, this volume, and Spence and Deroy, this volume.) suggest, should give us an initial reason to take seriously the hypothesis that synesthetic perception is continuous with non-synesthetic perception. 8 We can express the issue of informational integration in (normal) perception by asking whether and to what extent the individual perceptual mechanisms extracting particular distal features -e.g., shape, color, form, and motion (in vision); pitch, loudness, and timbre (in audition) -are mutually informationally encapsulated.
9 One view -call it the dedicated feature extraction view of normal perception would be that feature extractors are mutually informationally encapsulated -that the input to the computations carried out by the shape extractor (as it might be) do not include the output of the color extractor (as it might be), nor vice versa. An opposed view -the integrative view -would allow that there is substantial informational exchange between separate extractors. Thus, on the latter view, it can turn out that the extractors generate a working hypothesis about whatever features they concern, but that the working hypotheses generated by each can be used as a constraint on the working hypothesis generated by others -all before perception delivers a representation as output. Whereas the dedicated feature extraction view construes perception as carrying out a cluster of independent computational processes, the integrative view construes perception as negotiating a stable reconciliation between the disparate and mutually constraining results of its disparate sources.
Evidence for Integration
A first kind of evidence of informational interactions within a perceptual modality comes from Field et al. (2009) , who show that rod photoreceptors, which ordinarily function under scotopic conditions, provide input to blue/yellow opponent pathways in the macaque retina. A related idea, suggested (speculatively) by Broackes (2009) , is that human deuteranopes employ dynamic input from their intact S-cone receptors to extract color information that is ordinarily subserved in trichromats by the (non-dynamic) output of L-cones or M-cones. If correct, these proposals speak to the existence of informational integration/unencapsulation at the photoreceptor level: they suggest that blue/yellow extractors are not informationally encapsulated from rod scotopic output, and that red/green extractors are not encapsulated from s-cone output.
Another example of intramodal unencapsulation, again drawn from color vision, comes from the impressive variety of computational techniques for assigning color properties to surfaces (etc.) on the basis of the intensity array arriving at the retina. It is a commonplace that this signal, when it arrives at the retina, conflates the contribution made by the incident illumination with that made by the perceived object. Hence, one of the computational problems faced by color perception is to factor apart the signal so as to arrive at an estimate of the surface property of the perceived object (for an overview, see Cohen (2012) ). Researchers have uncovered a number of different computational proposals for solving this problem, each of which accounts for observed performance in some but not all ecologically realistic cases. Thus, for example, Maloney (1986) ; Maloney and Wandell (1986) show that a system with more classes of receptors than there are degrees of freedom in (the system's linear models of) surface reflection profiles can exploit its multiple receptoral signals to recover illumination-independent representations of surface features. Buchsbaum (1980) proposes a completely different model that rests on the assumption that the median lightness value in a scene corresponds to a middle grey surface, and computes from this assumption what the incident illumination would have to be to result in the observed intensity array. A related but distinct strategy proceeds from an assumption that anchors some part of the visual image to an extremal lightness value -for example, by treating the lightest visible surface as white (Land and McCann, 1971; Gilchrist et al., 1999) . Others have proposed estimating illuminants from information about mutual reflections in the scene (Funt et al., 1991) , the boundaries of regions known to be specular reflections (D'Zmura and Lennie, 1986; Lee, 1986) , and shadows (D'Zmura, 1992) . Still others propose to solve the problem by appeal to higher-order scene statistics, such as the correlation between redness and luminance within the scene (Golz and MacLeod, 2002) or the statistical distribution of colors within the scene (MacLeod, 2003; Brainard et al., 2006) .
Given this wide variety, and the merely partial predictive success of each proposal taken on its own, it is hard not to conclude that perception is likely deploying several different computational systems simultaneously, and somehow merging or reconciling their outputs to arrive at a stable estimate of surface colors. But if there is this sort of integration, then this tells against the view that there is any single, informationally encapsulated pathway for the extraction of surface color.
Analogous lessons emerge from research on the visual computation of depth from the two-dimensional retinal projection. Here, too, there appear to be a variety of systems at work. For example, investigators have proposed that, depending on the situation, depth can be computed from oculomotor cues such as accommodation (Wallach and Floor, 1971 ) and convergence (von Hosten, 1976) ; binocular disparity Poggio, 1977, 1979; Nakayama and Shimojo, 1990; Jones and Malik, 1992) ; dynamic cues such as motion parallax (Rogers and Graham, 1979) and "optic flow" (Longuet-Higgins and Prazdny, 1980; Prazdny, 1980) ; pictorial cues such as line convergence, relative position, memory for known object types (Ittelson, 1951; Epstein, 1965) , changes in regular texture gradients (Stevens, 1979; Kender, 1979; Witkin, 1981; Malik and Rosenholtz, 1994) , and the interpretation of shading (Horn, 1975 (Horn, , 1977 Pentland, 1989; Kersten et al., 1996) and edges (Guzman, 1968 (Guzman, , 1969 Huffman, 1971; Clowes, 1971; Waltz, 1975; Malik, 1987) .
11 Thus, once again, investigation has revealed a variety of systems that plausibly contribute to the perception of depth. And, while in principle it could turn out that there is a uniquely correct and fully general computational strategy -that all of the others turn out not to be involved in depth perception after all, this appears unlikely. After all, as we found when considering color perception, the different perceptual strategies that appear to contribute to depth perception differ in their conditions of application, and are differentially successful in accounting for human performance over a broad range of conditions. What all this suggests is that, as in the case of color perception, depth perception proceeds by accumulating evidence from an assortment of perceptual systems, and then integrates their outputs into a single representation.
And, indeed, similar lessons about integration hold between different features extracted within a single modality as well. Thus, there is increasing evidence that, say, luminance/chromatic properties are used by the visual system to estimate contrast, segmentation, form, texture, and more [CITES] . Similarly, the McCollough effect (McCollough, 1965 ) and similar illusions demonstrate that representations of form, orientation, motion, and the like can influence the representation of color. And there is abundant evidence of interaction between visual representations of luminance and motion. Thus, researchers have shown that motion processing is impaired or qualitatively different at isoluminance -e.g., that motion is represented as slower at isoluminance, that the direction of motion is far more difficult to discriminate at isoluminance, and that isoluminant stimuli can induce a motion aftereffect on luminance stimuli (Anstis, 2003 (Anstis, , 2004 Howe et al., 2006; Mullen and Baker, 1985; Thompson, 1982) . All of these findings give us reason for doubting that 11 See Palmer (1999, chapter 5) for a useful overview. the perceptual mechanisms for the extraction of distinct visual features are mutually encapsulated.
Nor are the sorts of perceptual interactions of interest limited to intramodal cases. Thus, to mention some well-known examples, the McGurk effect -in which subjects' visual perception of a mouth's motion affects their auditory perception of simultaneously heard speech sound (McGurk and MacDonald, 1976) -and the ventriloquist illusion -in which subjects perceive a ventriloquist's voice as originating from the location of the visually perceived dummy rather than that of the auditorily perceived ventriloquist (Pick et al., 1969; de Gelder, 2000, 2004) -are standardly taken to show that auditory and visual pathways are mutually interpenetrating. Similarly, the cutaneous rabbit illusion (Geldard and Sherrick, 1972) and cases of sensory substitution (Bach y Rita et al., 1969) are standardly taken to show interaction between tactile and visual pathways that would preclude their mutual encapsulation.
So far the evidence for integration I've discussed all takes the form of showing that changes in the perceptual response to one feature have systematic effects on the perceptual response to another feature. There is further, and more direct, evidence for perceptual integration in the sorts of clashes that predictably occur when distinct sources of perceptual information, possibly operating over different spatiotemporal scales, are combined at some stage in the perceptual process. Presumably the goal of combining this information is to arrive at a value consistent with (or, as consistent as possible with) the range of evidence supplied by the different perceptual strategies at work. And, needless to say, different strategies, implemented in different perceptual subsystems, may deliver inconsistent verdicts (particularly, but not exclusively, in laboratory settings designed specifically to pull them apart). When this happens, the perceptual system must have some way of managing the conflicts.
As it happens, there is evidence of exactly the sorts of conflict management strategies one might expect. Thus, for example, sometimes perception selectively prefers one strategy over others (e.g., as in our reaction to the Ames room, where perspective information about depth dominates over our expectations about the relative size of objects (Ames, 1952; von Helmholtz, 1962) ). In other cases perception combines the information from distinct perceptual strategies in some more complex way, by sending one or more of the strategies back to run on the input again in the hope of obtaining new answers that won't conflict, or by giving up (as, for example, we do with impossible Escher figures). The observation of such effects further supports the view that our net perceptual representations result from integrations of multiple perceptual strategies.
Morals
The instances of perceptual integration discussed above are entirely representative of the architecture of perception: informational integration is, to all appearances, ubiquitous (at many levels of organization) in the perceptual system. So overwhelming is the evidence in favor of integration that it becomes hard to avoid seeing informational interaction in perceptual mechanisms once one begins to look.
On reflection, this is perhaps less surprising than one might have thought. First, given a fixed number of sensory receptors, and a large (if finite) number of perceptible features to which we are sensitive, it is more or less inevitable that feature extractors should share information at one level or another. Second, the very idea of perceptual computation (which is central to perception on anyone's story) depends on sharing featural information. For, construed generally, perceptual computation means deriving values for new output features on the basis of features already extracted. Thus, when the perceptual system computes form from motion, or objecthood from edge locations, or illumination from higher order scene statistics (for example), it is using prior featural information -representations of feature exemplifications that have already been extracted -(possibly together with information about environmental regularities and channel conditions) to extract novel featural information. As such, the novel, extracted features depend systematically on the features used as input to the perceptual computation, which is just to say that the former cannot be informationally encapsulated from the latter.
Given these points, it is no surprise to learn of the many instances of informational integration in perception. If anything, the question is why the dedicated feature extraction view should have seemed plausible in the first place (to the extent it ever did). 
Continuity and Discontinuity
In so far as the dedicated feature extraction view and the integrative view offer us quite different pictures of the degree of informational integration present in normal perception, they make available different views of the relation between synesthetic and normal perception.
From the vantage point of the dedicated feature extraction view, the informational integration characteristic of synesthesia amounts to a pathological form of crosstalk between distinct, normatively encapsulated feature extractors. As such, accepting that view of normal perception is tantamount to endorsing a discontinuity view about the relation between synesthetic and normal perception. On the other hand, because the integrative picture 12 This is perhaps the place to mention that there is no in principle conflict between the view that normal perception depends extensively on the sort of informational integration we have been discussing and the view that there is substantial modularity/cognitive impenetrability (in the sense of Fodor (1983) ) in normal perception. First, the idea of integration between feature extractors leaves it open that the extractors might exhibit Fodor's hallmarks of modularity -they might be domain-specific, mandatory, fast, informationally encapsulated from central cognition, fixed in their neural architecture, and so on. Second, though the post-extractor integration phase definitionally involves combining the outputs of (a limited number of) feature extractors, nothing that has been said above requires that integrative processes recruit central cognitive states (or that they should otherwise exhibit the "isotropic" or "Quinean" features Fodor (1983) takes to threaten modularity). For more extensive discussion, see Burnston and Cohen (2014). conceives crosstalk between distinct feature extractors as a routine part of normal perception, the occurrence of such crosstalk in synesthetic cases won't mark the latter as pathological in the same way. This is not to say that the integrative view of (normal) perception is unable to see any distinction at all between normal and synesthetic perception. For one thing, even by the lights of the integrative view, the particular forms and degree of crosstalk characteristic of, say, grapheme-color synesthesia are statistically abnormal. For another, there's nothing to prevent the proponent of the integrative view from recognizing that synesthetic representations are unlike non-synesthetic perceptual representations in being typically erroneous: presumably, for example, the induced synesthetic color representation occurring in a grapheme-color synesthete is (ordinarily) an erroneous representation of the color of the perceived grapheme.
13 For a third, though the integrative view of normal perception involves abundant informational sharing between perceptual systems, there may well be interesting differences between this form of informational sharing and that underlying synesthesia. Thus, for example, in §1.2 we noted many cases in normal perception where the contents of a first perceptual subsystem interact with or influence the contents of a second perceptual subsystem; but we did not find cases in which the contents of a first perceptual subsystem triggered a representation in a second perceptual subsystem that had previously been dormant. But this latter sort of interaction is entirely typical of synesthesia: when a sound-color synesthete perceives the appropriate sort of triggering sound, she needn't have been previously representing a color in order to undergo the synesthetic concurrent color perception. And this is to say that the sound subsystem can affect the synesthete's color subsystem whether or not the latter had been active previously.
Such differences notwithstanding, the broad lesson stands: given the integrative view (but not given the dedicated feature extraction view), the integration present in synesthesia will look much more like an extension or enhancement of the forms of integration present in ordinary perception than an unprecedented, pathological case. To this extent, then, the integrative view of normal perception makes possible a continuity thesis about the relation between normal and synesthetic perception.
To see what such a continuity view amounts to, it may be helpful to compare the case of synesthesia against ordinary perceptual illusion, on the one hand, and tumor-or schizophrenia-induced hallucination, on the other. When I perceive the Müller-Lyer display, for example, I end up with a misrepresentation of the size of certain elements in the configuration. Plausibly, this occurs not because there is some radically discontinuous, pathological, and unusually error-prone mechanism for size representation at work in just these situations. Rather, the error comes about because the very same, highly reliable mechanisms for size and form perception that serve me well in ordinary 13 Here I ignore the complications connected with my own (somewhat idiosyncratic) account of errors of color representation (see Cohen, 2007 Cohen, , 2009 . For the record, I don't believe that there is ultimately a clash between those views and what I say here. contexts operate here as well, but misfire in predictable (indeed, instructive) ways when extended to this kind of configuration. Given all this, a continuity view about the relation between normal (veridical) perception and ordinary illusion seems appropriate. In contrast, perceptual (or apparently perceptual) hallucinations caused by certain tumors or schizophrenia are at least partly the result of mechanisms that are radically discontinuous, pathological, and unusually error-prone. As such, a continuity view about the relation between normal perception and such tumor-or schizophrenia-induced hallucinations is much less plausible. The continuity view about synesthesia is the view that the relation between synesthesia and normal perception is, in these senses, closer to that between ordinary perceptual illusion and normal perception than it is to that between tumor-/schizophrenia-induced hallucination and normal perception.
As we have seen, the evidence reviewed above strongly supports the integrative view over the dedicated feature extraction view of normal perception. And since the former but not the latter position supports a continuity view concerning synesthesia, the evidence for the integrative view also supports construing normal and synesthetic perception as species of a common kind.
Synesthetic and Non-synesthetic Associations: Some Similarities
A second line of support for a continuity thesis about the relation between synesthetic and normal perception lies in the finding that, when non-synesthetes are asked to make deliberate, nonce (non-synesthetic) associations between domains linked in synesthetic subjects, they do so in ways that -to a surprising extent -mirror the automatic, non-deliberate, much more stable, synesthetically mediated associations made by their synesthetic counterparts.
Grapheme-Color Intramodal Mapping
The first of the cases I want to discuss involves a comparison between grapheme-color associations made by synesthetes and normal controls. What makes grapheme-color associations interesting as a test case for continuity between synesthetic and non-synesthetic perception is that, while grapheme-color synesthesia is by far the most common (Day, 2005) and (at least in the last twenty years) probably the most widely studied form of synesthesia, pairings between graphemes and colors do not play any significant role at all in the mental lives of non-synesthetes. Of course, non-synesthetes can deliberately construct (nonce) grapheme-color associations; but there is no prior reason to expect that the pairings they choose should be much like the pairings in grapheme-color synesthetes in any significant respect. As it turns out, however, grapheme-color synesthetes and normals display a surprising level of consistency (within-and between-groups) in pairing letters and colors (Simner et al., 2005) . Thus, both within and between groups, 'a' tends to be associated with red, 'b' with blue, 'c' with yellow, and so on (cf. Baron-Cohen et al., 1993; Day, 2001 Day, , 2005 Rich et al., 2005) .
To be fair, Simner et al. (2005) go on to report differences between synesthete and control performance on this task. Specifically, they report that the particular grapheme-color pairings in synesthetes (but not normal controls) are mediated by frequency: higher frequency graphemes are paired with colors whose names are higher in lexical frequency.
14 They found that the pairings chosen by non-synesthetes were not mediated by these factors. Rather, they found that the pairings chosen by non-synesthetes were a function of the presentation order of materials, and the typicality of colors (as measured by standard category norm ranking (Battig and Montague, 1969) ).
Thus, it seems that synesthetes and non-synesthetes converge, to a surprising extent, in their choices of specific grapheme-color pairings, though differences in the properties of these pairings suggest that there may be different mechanisms underpinning the observed convergence. Given this situation, whether we should view grapheme-color pairings in synesthetes as two manifestations of a single psychological capacity will depend on how we individuate capacities. But even on the two capacities construal, it is hard to escape the conclusion that synesthetic and non-synesthetic grapheme-color pairings are closely related.
Nonetheless, whether construed as two versions of one capacity or two separate capacities, there are clear senses in which synesthetes outperform nonsynesthetes on grapheme-color pairings. Namely, synesthete pairings are more intrapersonally consistent over time, specific/fine-grained, and automatic, than those of non-synesthetes. (It is unsurprising that synesthetes outperform non-synesthetes on these measures, which are often used as diagnostics for the condition (Baron- Cohen et al., 1987 Cohen et al., , 1993 .)
Sound-Color Intermodal Mapping
Much of what I've said about intramodal associations between graphemes and colors holds true as well for intermodal associations between sounds and colors. Once again, the comparison of interest is between the synesthetically mediated pairings between sound and color and the sound-color pairings made by normal controls.
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There are a number of interesting shared trends in the sound-color pairings made by both synesthetes and non-synesthetes. First, synesthetes and normal controls exhibit significant within-and between-group convergence 14 Simner et al. (2005) note that a color term's lexical frequency correlates with its position in the Berlin and Kay hierarchy (Berlin and Kay, 1969; Lindsey and Brown, 2009) , hence that synesthetes are also pairing high frequency graphemes with colors whose lexical expression is more fundamental in the Berlin and Kay typology.
15 Sound-color synesthesia -also called chromaesthesia -is another common and (at least until recent years in which grapheme-color synesthesia may have pulled ahead) much-studied form of synesthesia.
in associating higher pitches with lighter/brighter colors, and lower pitches with darker colors. This convergence holds both in cases where the sounds in question are vowel sounds in natural language (Wundt, 1874; Ortmann, 1933; Karwoski and Odbert, 1938; Wicker, 1968; Marks, 1974) and in cases where the sounds are produced by (non-vocal) musical instruments (Karwoski et al., 1942; Wicker, 1968; Marks, 1974 Marks, , 1982 Marks, , 1987 Hubbard, 1996; Melara, 1989; Ward et al., 2006) . 16 Second, Ward et al. (2006) report that synesthetes and normal controls exhibit significant within-and between-group convergence in associating certain instrument timbres with particular chroma (cf. Mudge, 1920) : in their (somewhat hyperbolic) words, "musical notes from the piano and strings are, literally, more colourful than pure tones" (7). Third, Bleuler and Lehmann (1881); Voss (1929); Marks (1975) report a further shared trend: synesthetes and normal controls exhibit significant within-and between-group convergence in associating softer/louder sounds with smaller/larger colored patches. Though size is not a dimension of color, this shows yet another systematic similarity in the way synesthetes and non-synesthetes associate auditory and visual features.
These results are interesting not simply in that they reveal that synesthetes and non-synesthetes can both match individual sounds to individual colors; rather, they are interesting because they show that synesthetes and nonsynesthetes agree in the way they systematically map particular auditory dimensions onto particular visual dimensions. Because of the specificity of the agreement in synesthetic and non-synesthetic pairings that these findings reveal, they suggest that there may be a shared mechanism mediating the auditory-visual associations in synesthetes and non-synesthetes.
Be that as it may, there are, once again, clear respects in which synesthetes exhibit superior performance in matching sounds to colors. For, unsurprisingly, synesthetic sound-color pairings have both higher internal consistency and higher specificity in color selection relative to the sound-color pairings made by normals (Ward et al., 2006) .
Synesthetic Enhancement of Crossmodal Integration
A third line of support for the continuity view comes from recent work by Brang et al. (2012) showing that synesthetic performance on integrative perceptual tasks is enhanced relative to normal controls. Brang et al. (2012) bring this out by exploiting two much-studied intermodal interactions between visual and auditory perception known to be present in normal/non-synesthetic subjects. The first is the so-called double-flash illusion, in which a single visual flash is perceived as two visual flashes when accompanied by two auditory beeps (Shams et al., 2000) . The second is the intersensory facilitation of reaction time -the finding (Hershenson, 1962 ) that reaction times in congruent multimodal (simultaneously presented auditory and visual) stimulus detection tasks are significantly lower than reaction times for detection carried out in either modality alone, and, indeed, relative to what would be expected from a statistical summation of two independent, unimodal target detection processes (Miller, 1982 (Miller, , 1986 .
These tasks are interesting for the purpose of assessing the continuity thesis, since they are known instances of perceptual integration in non-synesthetic subjects, and therefore afford an opportunity to test how and whether the relevant sorts of integration are affected by the presence of synesthesia. Significantly, however, Brang et al. (2012) chose to run these experiments on grapheme-color synesthetes. Since none of the stimuli in either of their tasks involved graphemes, the grapheme-color synesthesia of their synesthetic subjects should not have been engaged directly on these particular tasks.
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As usual, given our purposes of assessing the continuity/discontinuity controversy, we are interested in the comparison between synesthetes and normal controls, as measured by their susceptibility to the double flash illusion, on the one hand, and the intersensory facilitation of reaction time on a detection task, on the other. For, if the types of perceptual interaction one sees in normal perception are different in kind from what occurs in synesthesia, as per a discontinuity view, one would not expect that the presence of synesthesia would have any systematic effect on them. In contrast, if perceptual interaction in normal perception is continuous with -a weaker or less pervasive form of the same kind as -perceptual interaction in normal controls, one would expect that the presence of synesthesia would enhance such forms of perceptual interaction. Brang et al. (2012) report results on both experiments that fall squarely into line with the predictions of the continuity view. Thus, in the double flash experiment, they found that (grapheme-color) synesthetes were significantly less likely than normals to report veridically that there was only a single flash accompanied by two beeps (viz., synesthetes were significantly more susceptible to the crossmodal illusion). And in the intersensory facilitation experiments, they found that synesthetic subjects benefited significantly more (relative to their unimodal baselines) from a multimodal stimulus than did normal controls.
These results are particularly significant because they show not only that there are systematic similarities between synesthetic and non-synesthetic performance in associating elements within or across perceptual modalities (as do the cases discussed in §2), but that the effects are enhanced or exaggerated in synesthetes even in domains where their synesthesia is unengaged. This fact is explicable on the hypothesis that the enhancement is due to an interaction between synesthesia and some shared associative mechanism operating in both populations. In contrast, if normal perception and synesthesia are fundamentally discontinuous, then one would not expect the whatever crosstalk underlies synesthesia to have any systematic effect on performance on tasks involving unrelated forms of perceptual integration (relative to the performance of normal controls). 18 It would appear, then, that the observed results are (at least partly) explicable on the continuity view, while it is very hard to imagine what a discontinuity-friendly explanation would look like. As such, these results strongly support the continuity view.
Conclusion
The initial question with which we began was how we should understand the relationship between synesthetic and non-synesthetic perception. The answer to this question that I've been advancing in the foregoing -the continuity view -is that the two are less different, hence that synesthesia is less of a pathological outlier, than traditional views would allow.
To be sure, there are ways of thinking about normal perception, such as the dedicated feature extraction view, that exaggerate the difference between it and synesthesia. But it has been my contention that these ways of thinking about normal perception are unjustified. I claim that once we adopt a more adequate view of normal perception -one that recognizes informational integration occurring within and between modalities, in cases involving receptoral and postreceptoral combination, in cases involving coordination between distinct computational strategies, and so on -it is much more difficult to construe the (admittedly more extensive) informational integration characteristic of synesthetic perception as fundamentally different in kind. Moreover, the view that synesthetic and non-synesthetic perception are species of a common kind is far easier to reconcile with the observed systematic similarities between synesthetic and non-synesthetic cross-domain associations. Finally, the continuity view predicts the otherwise surprising finding that that synesthetes perform better than normal controls on integrative perceptual tasks, even when those tasks do not engage the pairings with respect to which those subjects are synesthetic. To the extent that having an explanation of these findings is better than not having one, these considerations further support the continuity view.
In advocating continuity I don't mean to suggest that synesthetic and normal perception are in all, or all interesting, respects alike. Nor do I claim that there are no differences between informational integration in normal and synesthetic perception. Rather, the claim is that that when we think about ordinary perception as displaying various kinds of integration that are less controversially present in synesthetic perception, this gives us a better way of thinking of the ordinary cases, and more fully reveals what is shared by both types of perceivers.
19
